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CASE NOTES
the slayer immediately committed suicide, equity would be achieved
by permitting the innocent heirs of both joint tenants to share equally
in the property. No doubt the problem would be best resolved by a
legislative enactment setting down the requirements of the public policy
of the state when one joint tenant murders the other.19
CONTEMPT-DOCTRINE OF "PURGATION BY OATH"
OVERRULED IN ILLINOIS
Defendant Gholson was being tried on a criminal charge for violation
of the Illinois Medical Practice Act.' A contempt petition was filed
against him and his wife charging that they circulated an advertisement
extolling defendant with intent to influence the jurors before whom he
was to be tried. They were also charged with having organized a motor
caravan of persons, whose attendance at the trial caused some disturbance,
with intent to influence the jury. Defendants denied any unlawful intent
in their verified answers, admitting the advertisement circulation and
knowledge of the motor caravan. Defendants contended that they were
purged of indirect contempt by virtue of their verified petition. The
Illinois Appellate Court for the Second District affirmed the finding
of the trial court that, under the doctrine of "purgation by oath," the
answers of the defendants were insufficient to purge them of the alleged
contempt. 2 Judgment was reversed and remanded by the Illinois Supreme
Court in declaring that the doctrine of "purgation by oath" is no longer
to be adhered to in Illinois. People v. Gholson, 412 111. 294, 106 N.E.
2d 333 (1952).
The power of the courts to punish for contempt is inherent,3 and
exists independent of statutes.4 Contempt of court, as stated in the
Gholson case, may be classified as criminal, civil, direct, or indirect.
Criminal contempt is conduct directed against the dignity or authority
of the court, while civil contempt consists of the failure to obey a court
order.4 Indirect contempt is a contempt committed outside the presence
of the court, and direct contempt is one committed in the presence of
the court while in session," or in any place set apart for the use of any
19 Many states have statutes preventing the acquisition of property by an unlawful
killing. The constitutionality of such statutes was upheld in Hamblin v. Marchant,
103 Kan. 508, 175 Pac. 678 (1918). For a thorough explanation, see Wade, Acquisi-
tion of Property by Wilfully Killing Another, 49 Harv. L. Rev. 715 (1936).
1 M. Rev. Stat. (1951) c. 91, SS 1-16(x).
2 People v. Gholson, 344 Ii. App. 199, 100 N.E. 2d 343 (1951).
3 People v. White, 334 M. 465, 166 N.E. 100 (1929).
4 People v. Hagopian, 408 IRI. 618, 97 N.E. 2d 782 (1951).
5People v. Gholson, 412 II. 294, 106 NE. 2d 333 (1952).
6 Ibid.
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constituent part of the court.7 Thus, the filing of a forged will for
probate by an individual who knows it is such is a direct contempt.8
One guilty of direct contempt may be punished summarily by the court.9
In the case of an indirect contempt, however, there must be an informa-
tion, notice, and a citation or rule to show cause served on the alleged
contemnor, who is entitled to a hearing, unless the contempt is admitted
in open court, in which case the contemnor may be punished summarily.' °
The mere fact that the contemnor's conduct also constituted a violation
of a criminal statute is no bar to his punishment for contempt, the
proceeding for which is criminal in form.1 2 In civil contempt, the de-
fendant's guilt must be shown by a preponderance of the evidence, while
in criminal contempt, it must be shown beyond a reasonable doubt.'3
At common law, under the doctrine of "purgation by oath," applied
in cases of indirect contempt, the defendant was entitled to be dis-
charged if his sworn answer fully denied the charges against him, and,
if the answer was false, he was then to be prosecuted for perjury. No
evidence was admissible to contradict the answer. 14 Until the Gholson
case, the Illinois courts had faithfully adhered to this common law
doctrine. 15
In Illinois, the doctrine has been applied only in cases of criminal con-
tempt.' 6 Under the common law it was often held that the doctrine
would be applied only in contempt cases arising out of suits at law,
but not in equity cases. 17 Although an early Illinois case assumed that
to be the law,"' it was stated in People v. West Chicago Park Commis-
7 People v. Hagopian, 408 I11. 618, 97 N.E. 2d 782 (1951).
8 In re Estate of Kelly, 365 111. 174, 6 N.E. 2d 113 (1937).
9People v. Whitlow, 357 IMl. 34, 191 N.E. 222 (1934); People v. Rougetti, 344
Ill. 107, 176 N.E. 292 (1931).
1OPeople v. Hagopian, 408 I11. 618, 97 N.E. 2d 782 (1951).
11Dreman v. Fields, 406 I11. 153, 92 N.E. 2d 654 (1950).
12 People v. Harrison, 403 Il1. 320, 86 N.E. 2d 208 (1949).
13People v. Fusco, 397 111. 468, 74 N.E. 2d 531 (1947).
14 People v. Gholson, 412 Ill. 294, 106 N.E. 2d 333 (1952); Brannon v. State,
202 Miss. 571, 29 So. 2d 916 (1947); 17 C.J.S., Contempt § 83(b) (1939).
15 The following is a partial list of Illinois Supreme Court cases wherein the
doctrine was announced to be law: People v. Hagopian, 408 11. 618, 97 N.E. 2d
782 (1951); People v. Whitlow, 375 111. 34, 191 N.E. 222 (1934); People v. Roughetti,
344 I11. 107, 176 N.E. 292 (1931); People v. McLaughlin, 334 I11. 354, 166 N.E. 67
(1929); People v. McDonald, 314 I11. 548, 145 N.E. 636 (1924); People v. Severinghaus,
313 111. 456, 145 N.E. 220 (1924); People v. Seymour, 272 I11. 295, 111 N.E. 1008
(1916); Oster v. People, 192 111. 473, 61 N.E. 469 (1901); Buck v. Buck, 60 I1.
105 (1871); Crook v. People, 16 11. 534 (1855).
1'Bender v. Frost, 317 Ill. App. 441, 46 N.E. 2d 393 (1943).
17 17 C.J.S., Contempt § 83(b) (1939).
18Buck v. Buck, 60 Il1. 105 (1871).
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sioners19 that "an examination of these cases... discloses that in none ...
was this stated to be the rule of practice. But the true test is whether
the contempt charged is civil or criminal."20
The history of "purgation by oath" has come to an end in Illinois
in the Gholson case when the court declared that the "doctrine ... will
no longer be adhered to by this court, and all previous decisions .. .
upholding . .. that doctrine, in that respect, are hereby overruled."'2 1
The doctrine has been abandoned by the United States Supreme
Court,22 and, apparently, by most of the state courts.2 The Illinois
court, in stamping out the "dying embers" of this doctrine, stated that
a court cannot adequately pf'eserve its authority without "power to
inquire and determine if contumacious acts ...have been perpetrated
against-the court.... We believe that if the contemnor can deprive the
court of authority to inquire into ...his acts, that would tend to de-
stroy rather than to uphold public confidence and respect in our
courts. '24 This view seems sound and logical. 2 Little, if anything,
remains to be added to the reasoning of the court in the light of this
progressive opinion, which remains a milestone in the recent display of
legal realism of the Illinois Supreme Court.
TORTS-MISREPRESENTATIONS OF PRIOR OFFERS
AS CONSTITUTING FRAUD
Plaintiff leased defendant's premises at $4,500 per year; he was told
by his lessor that the latter had received a bona fide offer to lease the
premises at $10,000 per year. Plaintiff was informed that unless he could
meet that offer, defendant would evict him at the end of their current
lease. Relying on defendant's representations, plaintiff signed a twelve
year lease with a rent of $10,000 per year. After paying several monthly
installments, he discovered that the lessor's representations had been
completely false. Plaintiff brought an action for deceit and the trial
court sustained defendant's demurrer. Reversing the lower court, the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the plaintiff had
19 275 I11. App. 387 (1934).
20 Ibid., at 391.
21 People v. Gholson, 412 I11. 294, 303, 106 N.E. 2d 333, 338 (1952).
22 Clark v. U.S., 289 U.S. 1 (1933).
23 Osborne v. Purdome, 244 S.W. 2d 1005 (Mo., 1951). In 12 Am. Jut., Contempt
73 (1938), it is stated that the oath of a contemnor is no longer a bar to a con-
tempt citation.
24 People v. Gholson, 412 111. 294, 302, 106 N.E. 2d 333, 337 (1952).
25 A rather recent case assumed the doctrine of "purgation by oath" to be a
preservative of an important right and concluded it to be logical merely because
of the fact that it was a common law rule. See Craft v. Culbreth, 150 Fla. 60, 6
So. 2d 638 (1942).
